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Introduction
1 Through an exposition of the similarities between Mead’s and Sen’s ideas regarding the
social constitution of the self, we see that, by discussing the nature of the behavioral
foundation  of  economics,  Sen  tackled  the  problem  of  “identity”  stressing  that:
“community,  nationality,  class,  race,  sex,  union  membership,  the  fellowship  of
oligopolist,  revolutionary  solidarity,  and  so  on,  provide  identities  that  can  be,
depending on the context, crucial to ourselves” (Sen 1985: 348). A person’s identities
and concept of their own welfare can be influenced by one’s identification with others.
Persons’ experiences in their proximity to others occur in relation to what Mead calls
the  “generalized  other”  namely,  the:  “organized  community  or  social  group which
gives  to  the  individual  his  unity  of  self”  (Mead  1934:  154).  The  attitude  of  the
“generalized other” is that of the whole community, that is, the common ethos which
gives  unity  and consistency to  the person’s  identities  as  well  as  person’s  relational
resources combined with their abilities.
2 This paper is  developed as follows.  First,  I  expose the main characteristics  of  Sen’s
Capability Approach (CA) as an alternative to “welfarist” and ‘utilitarian’ approaches. I
then point out the strict relation between CA and the way in which people elaborate
their  identities  and  how  such  identities  condition  the  desires,  interests,  and
preferences implied in evaluative processes. However, even if Sen develops a paradigm
in which people’s  identities and values regarding the ways of  living that they have
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reason  to  value  are  strictly  intertwined  with  community  identities  and  interests,  I
argue that a more specific in-depth analysis is needed to conceptualize how a person’s
identities,  values,  desires,  and interests are likely to be constituted. In particular,  a
more  specific  in-depth  analysis  is  required  using  a  “disciplinary”  net  that  meshes
conceptual elements of philosophy, psychology (social and cognitive), and social and
economic sciences. This net would be particularly valid for economics, I argue. In fact,
the economic behaviors of human agents are part of general “human conduct” and
represent in everyday life the manifestations of a person’s – or as Mead calls it a self’s –
identities generated in a community and strictly related to rule-based conduct.
3 I  then  introduce  my main  proposal,  that  a  pragmatist  approach,  and  in  particular
Mead’s approach to human behavior, would pave the way for a new theoretical frame, a
sort of ‘paradigm’ concerning human conduct,  in which the various disciplines that
concern the different components of  self  are functionally intertwined in a complex
model of human conduct. Hence it is possible to identify some interesting connections
between Sen’s paradigm and Mead’s social theory of the self that would implement “a
pragmatist and institutionalist account of evaluation” (De Munck & Zimmermann 2015:
132) from a transdisciplinary perspective aiming to address how valuable options are
constituted and practical judgments formulated.1 A practical judgment or, as Sen calls
it, an evaluative judgment, is the final phase of an act of evaluation about one’s desired
quotidian outcomes, means, and ends-in-view.
 
The Capability Approach. An Alternative to Welfarist
and Utilitarian Approaches
4 The CA is not a theory; it is a “paradigm,” namely a mode of thinking within which to
conceptualize and evaluate phenomena that determine the ways of living that people
value  (Sen  1990a:  114,  2000:  74  and  2009:  231-2.  See  Robeyns  2005:  94-6).  Persons’
capabilities can be defined as what they are effectively able to do, that is, the effective
opportunities  they  have  to  undertake  the  actions  and  activities  that  they  wish  to
engage in, and be who they want to be. 
5 It follows then that the CA provides a tool to be used to consider evaluative purposes,
focusing upon the information needed in order to make judgments about individual
well-being, and it is not reducible to alternative approaches such as, for example, an
evaluation  in  monetary  terms.  In  particular,  it  specifies  an  evaluative  space as  an
alternative to other evaluative approaches, such as ‘welfarist’ and ‘utilitarian’ optics. 
6 Welfarism – a special case of consequentialism – is the view that the moral character of
society can be judged entirely upon information about the utility levels achieved by
every human being in that society. It is, according to Sen (1979: 538): “a strong version
of the condition of ‘neutrality’ […] and demands that the social ranking of any pair of
states be neutral to the non-utility features of the states, i.e. the concentration must be
exclusively on the utility information about the states.” It thus implies informational
restrictions. However, as Sen argues, there are principles of social judgments that are
under-discussed in traditional welfare economics – e.g. liberty, non-exploitation, non-
discrimination – that require use of non-utility information (Sen 1979: 547).2
7 On  the  other  hand,  Sen’s  critique  of  utilitarian  approaches,  more  specifically  to
marginal utility, is strictly related to the notion of “equality” as referring to marginal
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utility.  Utilitarianism is  a  moral  principle  relating to  marginal  utility,  according to
which each individual gets the same marginal utility when a fixed income is distributed
among a set of individuals (assuming that marginal utility for each diminishes the more
income an individual has). The equality of marginal utility embodies equal treatment of
everyone’s interests. The moral importance of an individual’s needs is based exclusively
upon the notion of marginal utility. The question, according to Sen, is: “whether the
size of marginal utility irrespective of total utility enjoyed by the person, is an adequate
index  of  moral  importance”  (Sen  1979:  200).  Marginal  utility  measurements  are
automatically identified as indicators of social importance,3 but they say little about
real  human  beings’  interests.  As  Sen  writes:  “The  recognition  of  the  fundamental
diversity  of  human  beings does,  in  fact,  have  very  deep  consequences,  affecting  not
merely the utilitarian conception of social good, but others as well” (Sen 1979: 202,
emphasis mine; see also Sen 2000: 69-70). This is strictly intertwined with the criticism
of  the  contemporary  choice  theory  assumption  according  to  which  utility  is  the
representation of a person’s preference. However, if  on the one hand this approach
does not require us to compare different individual’s mental conditions of pleasure or
desire,  on  the  other  hand  it  foregoes  “the  possibility  of  direct  interpersonal
comparisons of utilities” (Sen 2000: 67-8). The difficulty cannot be overcome assuming
the same choice of behavior and the same type of demand function. This is because,
given interpersonal diversity related to both physical and psychical relational factors,
interpersonal  comparisons  are  “quite  a  distinct  matter  from  explaining  choice
behavior” (Sen 2000: 69).
8 Summing up, Sen argues that an individual’s well-being cannot be judged exclusively in
terms of their utilities, and this is because people seem to have very different needs,
varying with health conditions, climatic conditions, work conditions, and more general
social and cultural background, as well as personal temperament and character.
 
Needs, Interests, Identities
9 The CA considers the active role things play in the needs of individuals. Individual’s
claims  are  thus  assessed  not  by  the  resources  or  primary  goods  the  individual
possesses, but: “by the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose between different ways
of living that they can have reason to value” (Sen 1990a: 114).4 This means that any
individual has a partial ordering of needs and interests, and such partial ordering has
to consider a broad uniformity of personal preferences, namely, the intensity of one’s
needs, as well as certain established conventions of relative importance (Sen 1979: 219),
that is, some general social rules that contribute to general interests shared by people of
the same cultural and social context. As Sen (2000: 296) puts it, three aspects of human
capabilities  have  to  be  considered:  1)  their  direct  relevance  to  the  well-being  and
freedom of people; 2) their indirect role through influencing social change; and 3) their
indirect role by influencing economic production.
10 Thus, a distinction should be made between “functionings,” “achieved functionings,”
and “capabilities.” Strictly related to this distinction, it is that between “achievements”
and “valuable options” from which one can choose. A functioning is what a person
manages to do or to be, and a person’s capability amounts to the functionings that they
could have achieved. The combination of a person’s functionings reflects her actual
achievements,  whereas  “the  capability  set  represents  the  freedom  to  achieve:  the
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alternative functioning combinations from which this person can choose” (Sen 2000:
75).5 Thus capabilities are derived from functionings, including all the information on
the  functioning  combinations  that  a  person  can  chose  (see  Sen  2009:  236).6 Sen
formalizes this, arguing that a person’s capability is represented by: “a set of n-tuples
of funtionings from which the person can choose any one n-tuple” (Sen 1990a: 114).
Hence capability is strictly related to ideas of opportunity, freedom, and advantage (see
Basu & López-Calva 2011).
11 A good has certain characteristics that the individual may consider of interest. But in
order for an individual to convert the characteristics of a good into a functioning, there
are  some  personal,  social,  and  environmental conversion factors related  to  the
circumstances that influence the choices that people make from the capability set. In
particular, Sen distinguishes five sources of conversion factors that should be central to
capability  evaluations:  1)  personal  heterogeneities,  namely,  “disparate  physical
characteristics connected with disability; illness, age or gender, and these make their
needs  diverse”;  2)  environmental  diversities,  related  to  climatic  circumstances;  3)
variations  in  social  climate,  “including  public  educational  arrangements,  and  the
prevalence or absence of crime and violence in the particular location”; 4) differences in
relational  perspectives,  related  to  differences  of  conventions  and  customs  between
communities, and 5) distribution of incomes within the family (Sen 2000: 70-1, and 2009:
255-6).
12 Relevant  personal  characteristics  govern  the  conversion  of  primary  goods  into  an
individual’s ability to promote their ends. Two individuals with identical capability sets
are  likely  to  make  different choices following  various  types  and  levels  of  achieved
functionality as well as different ideas of what good life is. For sure, conversion factors
matter because they have to do with a person’s real opportunities, not only with what
his  or  her own desiderata may be.  If  a  person has physical  disability,  i.e.  she is  in
wheelchair,  and lives  in a  place where there are architectonic  barriers,  she will  be
obliged to make different choices respect to other people with no disabilities, despite
the fact that they may share the same idea of what good life is. Moreover people are
conditioned in their choices by their background and social norms, that is to say that
no one is independent of the influences of the society in which they live. However,
what I want to point out here, is that given two persons having the very similar abilities,
or even disabilities, and having very similar capability sets as well, they may, and often
do make different choices. Closely connected to personal characteristics is the socio-
environmental  and  the  institutional  context  (broadly  defined).  An  individual’s
identification with their social environment in itself draws attention to the tension,
among on the one hand the sense of affiliation to a community and the conformation to
a  certain  model  of  behavior,  and on the  other  hand to  the  individual  tendency  to
differentiate  itself  from inherited habits.  The nature  of  community  relationships  is
crucial to the conversion of personal resources into functionalities. As Sen writes:
To  note  the  role  of  “thinking,  choosing  and  doing”  by  individuals  is  just  the
beginning  of  recognizing  what  actually  does  happen  (we  do,  of  course,  as
individuals, think about issues and choose and perform actions), but we cannot end
there without an appreciation of the deep and pervasive influence of society on our
“thinking,  choosing  and  doing.”  When  someone  thinks,  chooses,  and  does
something, it is for sure, that person – and not someone else – who is doing these
things. But it would be hard to understand why and how he or she undertakes these
activities without comprehension of his or her societal relations. (Sen 2009: 245)
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13 Ideas of the good life are strongly influenced by family, community, cultural ties, and
background.  This  is  why  it  is  not  possible,  according  to  Sen,  to  list  particular
capabilities, for different social, cultural, and geographical settings have different lists
of  capabilities  which  influence  selection.  As  he  puts  it,  the  capability  approach
emphasizes an individual’s “freedom to choose how to live – including the opportunity
to  pursue  parts  of  her  ancestral  cultural  preferences  if so  desired”  (Sen 2009:  238;
original  emphasis).  However,  this  freedom cannot be turned into an argument that
supports those behavioral patterns irrespective of the individual’s freedom to choose.7
14 Now the CA is strictly related to the way in which individuals elaborate their identities
and  how  such  identities  condition  desires,  interests,  and  preferences,  affecting
practical judgments about desires outcomes, means, and ends-in-view in everyday life.
As Sen notes, there are some social constraints that condition individual choice. This
does not mean that such constraints are negative. On the contrary, they are closely
interwoven  with  an  individual’s  biography  and  personal  identities,  values,  and
preferences. As Sen points out, the self’s identities are generated in a community and
are related to rule-based conduct. The CA concerns the role of social influences on what
people value about the life of the community in which they live and what influences
shape their values. It is hard, he writes, “to envision cogently how persons in society
can think, choose or act without being influenced in one way or another by the nature
and working of the world around them” (Sen 2009: 244-5). More precisely, discussing
the  behavioral  foundation  of  economics,  Sen  tackled  the  problem  of  “identity,”
stressing  that:  “community,  nationality,  class,  race,  sex,  union  membership,  the
fellowship of oligopolists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, provide identities that
can be, depending on the context, crucial to ourselves” (Sen 1985: 348; see also Sen
2009: 246). An individual’s identities and concept of their own welfare can be influenced
by the position of others in ways that may involve identifying with them. This means
that  the  pursuit  of  self-interest  may  well  be  influenced  by  consideration  for  the
interests of others in the group with whom the individual identifies.8 The recognition
of interdependence of interests may suggest certain social rules of behavior which are
of great instrumental importance in the improvement of the respective goals of the
members of that group.9 As Sen writes: “between the claims of oneself and the claims of
all  lie  the  claims  of  a  variety  of  groups  –  for  example,  families,  friends,  local
communities, peer groups, and economic and social classes” (Sen 1977: 318). These are
intermediate areas of concern, and even if we dismiss a merely utilitarian approach an
egoistic approach is the is not the only alternative. Elsewhere he argues that: 
One of  the  ways  in  which the  sense  of  identity  can operate  is  through making
members  of  a  community  accept  certain  rules  of  conduct  as  part  of  obligatory
behavior  toward  others  in  the  community  […]  acceptance of  rules  of  conduct
toward others with whom one has some sense of identity is part of a more general
behavioral phenomenon of acting according to fixed rules, without following the
dictates of goal-maximisation. (Sen 1985: 349)
15 Thus, an individual can act not only on the basis of given individual preferences but
also on the basis of the importance attached to social interactions in the emergence of
shared values and commitments. And social values “can play – and have played – an
important part in the success of various forms of social organization” (Sen 2000: 261).10
16 In support of his thesis, Sen refers to Adam Smith’s idea, expressed in The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, according to which there are some general rules of conduct, that have
been  fixed  in  our  minds  by  habitual  reflection,  that  are  of  great  use  in  correcting
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misrepresentation of self-love concerning what is appropriate in a particular situation
(Smith 1790:  160).  There  is  also  a  “natural  selection”  argument  that  supports  such
behavioral modes, leading to their survival and stability,  as well  as an evolutionary
influence that works in a direction quite different from the survival of self-satisfaction
(Sen 1985: 350, 1973: 252-3, and 2000: 272-4). Moral behavior tends sometimes to take
the form of simply following established conventions. However, even when individuals
are moved by the implications of moral arguments, they may perceive their choices: “in
terms of acting according to some well-established practices in society” (Sen 2010: 56).
Thus non-self-interested behavior is, according to Sen, the combination of deliberative
and evolutionary selection within an integrated framework.
17 According to Sen, Smith’s emphasis upon the importance of motives other than the
pursuit of one’s own gain shows that human beings are not invariably guided only by
self-interest, and that: “there are good ethical and practical reasons for encouraging
motives other than self-seeking” (Sen 2010: 53-4). Smith’s approach of the ‘impartial
spectator’  focuses  on  the  relevance  of  the  society  in  the  “valuational  exercise  of
individuals”  (Sen  2009:  245).  It  refers  to  an  “open  impartiality,”  the  “eyes  of  all
mankind,” that is, to view our sentiments and motives “with the eyes of other people,
or as other people are likely to view them” (Smith 1790: III, 2). The “impartial” point of
view  permits  us  to  consider  other  people’s  interests  and  give  pertinence  to  other
people’s  perspectives,  hence  to  incorporate  into  the  evaluative  process  an  idea  of
“social justice.” As Sen writes:
the basic ideas of justice are not alien to social beings, who worry about their own
interests but are also able to think about family members, neighbors, fellow citizens
and  about  other  people  in  the  world.  The  thought  experiment  involving  the
‘impartial  spectator’  that  Adam Smith  beautifully  analyzed  (beginning  with  the
powerful  question:  What  would  an  ‘impartial  spectator’  make  of  it?)  is  a
formalization of an informal – and pervasive – idea that occurs to most of us. Space
does not have to be artificially created in the human mind for the idea of justice or
fairness – through moral bombardment or ethical haranguing. That space already
exists, and it is a question of making systematic, cogent and effective use of the
general concerns that people do have. (Sen 2000: 262)
18 This does not mean that people think in the sense in which groups think, but that the
interdependence of individual valuations is also related to the importance that they
attach to being able to do certain things in collaboration with others. 
19 So, it follows that the CA includes different social structures as one of its conceptual
tools.  The  established  social  rules  of  behavior  are  shown  to  play  a  crucial  role  in
conditioning more general human conduct.
 
An Interdisciplinary Net as a Necessary Complement
to Sen’s Capability Approach
20 In an article quoted by Sen in his The Idea of Justice (2009: 244), Stewart and Deneulin
argued that Sen’s CA has an “individualistic orientation of the approach.” In particular,
the authors maintain that CA “shares the individualism of the utilitarian approach,”
assuming  that  individuals  are  “atoms who come together  for  instrumental  reasons
only, and not as an intrinsic aspect of their way of life” (Stewart & Deneulin 2002: 66).
In other words, Sen would make “individual freedoms and capabilities the one relevant
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space for evaluation of quality of life, with structures of living together assessed only
instrumentally” (Stewart & Deneulin 2002: 68).
21 In a more recent paper, Deneulin and McGregor argued that “the capability approach
as advanced by Sen, ultimately conceives of individual freedom in an individualistic
light.  This  logically  relates  to  the  ethical  individualism  of  the  approach,  where
individual  freedoms  provide  the  yardstick  for  evaluating  social  arrangements”
(Deneulin & McGregor 2009: 4). In other words, CA does not consider sufficiently the
dynamic social generation of meanings, “seen primarily in terms of positive or negative
constraints” (Deneulin & McGregor 2009: 19). For this reason in CA, “[f]ollowing the
spirit  of  the  enlightenment  [the]  individual  is  seen  as  analytically  separable  from
society” (Deneulin & McGregor 2009: 19). This analytical “separability” can be regarded
both as  an ethical  as  well  as  a  methodological  assumption,  namely the assumption
similar  to that  of  the utilitarian approach in which individuals  “are assumed to be
atoms  who  come  together  for  instrumental  reasons  only.”  However,  even  if  the
assumption of the individual as analytically separable from society can be considered as
an  ethical  assumption,  Sen  discusses  the  position  of  Stewart  and  Deneulin  as  one
position  which  wrongly  identifies  “capabilities  approach  as  methodological
individualism” (Sen 2009: 244). As also Robeyns argues: “It is difficult to see how the
capability  approach  can  be  understood  to  be  methodologically  or  ontologically
individualistic,  especially  since  Sen  himself  has  analyzed  some  processes  that  are
profoundly  collective,  such  as  his  analysis  of  households  as  sites  of  cooperative
conflict” (Robeyns 2005: 108).11 
22 Even if Sen develops a paradigm in which individual identities and values are strictly
intertwined with the recognition of the interdependence of community identity and
the interests of others, it seems to me that a more specific in-depth analysis is needed
to conceptualize how people’s identities, values, desires and interests are constituted. In
other words, the CA, for obvious reasons, lacks a theoretical tool to conceptualize social
and psychological processes at the basis of the social construction of shared meanings,
as  well  as  of  the  constitution  and  conditioning  of  people’s  habits  of  thought  and
behavior. Whilst Sen highlights the elements that have to be considered in order to
develop a more complete and articulated paradigm regarding human conduct, he does
not offer (and he does not wish to offer) an epistemological tool to enter into an in-
depth analysis of its social and psychological constituents. Some important questions to
which Sen’s tool cannot reply can be summarized as follows: how are general rules of
conduct  fixed  in  our  mind  by  habitual  reflection?  What  are  the  bio-psycho-social
processes at the basis of our corrective misrepresentation of self-love concerning what
is appropriate to do in a particular situation? How has ‘natural selection’ led to the
survival and stability of certain behavioral modes rather than others in a particular
cultural  context  as  opposed to  another?  How can evolutionary influence work in a
direction other than to in that which guarantees the survival of self-satisfaction?
23 To reply  to  these  questions,  a  more specific  in-depth analysis  is  needed through a
disciplinary net that blends conceptual elements of philosophy, psychology (social and
cognitive), with the social and economic sciences. Such an analysis would enable us to
conceptualize  how individual  identities  expressed in their  values,  desires,  interests,
economic preferences relate to their “ways to behave” are constituted. Thus, it would
offer  a  useful  theoretical  tool  to  understand  evaluative  purposes,  what  individuals
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manage to do or to be, the functionality they choose in regard to social opportunities,
their freedom, and the consequences of their choices.
24 This disciplinary blend would be particularly valid for economic science, I  argue. In
fact,  assuming that  economic preferences and choices are part  of  the most general
category of “human conduct,” which represents in everyday life the manifestations of
self-identity generated in a community and related to rules-based conduct, we see that
economics, seen as a social science more than a mathematical one, is part of a more
general  frame which  aims  to  understand  human conduct  and  behavior.12 However,
since economic language makes it hard to discuss patterns of social behavior, given the
ambiguity of the instrumental value of certain social rules in influencing processes of
choice,  a  wider  approach,  namely  Mead’s  pragmatist  approach to  human behavior,
would  offer  a  good  starting  point  to  develop  a  new  theoretical  frame,  a  sort  of
paradigm  concerning  human  conduct  in  which  the  disciplines  which  engage  with
different components of self are seen as functionally intertwined in a complex model of
human conduct. Thus it is possible to discover some interesting connections between
Sen’s paradigm and Mead’s social theory of the self which would implement the CA
from a trans-disciplinary perspective. This trans-disciplinary paradigm aims to address
the ways through which options are constituted, as well as ideas of being what people
want to be and do. In other words, a connection between Sen’s and Mead’s approaches
will offer the conceptual tools which would help clarify how individuals evaluate the
“valuable” life and, by extension, how they develop their attitudes and dispositions to
think and behave, namely the habits at the basis of their everyday practical judgments.
13
 
Mead’s Bio-Social Theory of the Self and Human
Conduct as the Framework for the Interdisciplinary
Net
25 In a 1911 review of Benjamin M. Anderson’s Social  Value:  A Study in Economic Theory.
(Critical  and Constructive),  Mead highlights  that  many social  forces  besides economic
processes shape economic values. However, while economists admitted at the time the
real  influence  of  social  conditions  and  organization  upon  economic  goods,  their
theories and methods “hark back to the individualistic period with its contract theory
of  society  and  its  Humean  psychology”  (Mead  1911:  433).14 Thus  Mead  shared
Anderson’s thesis according to which: “values can be conceived to exist only as social
phenomena. They arise not through the addition of the pleasures and pains of men, but
through  organized  social  activity  which  is  supra-individual”  (Mead  1911:  433).
Connecting Cooley’s sociology with Dewey’s functional psychology, Anderson argues
that social organization gives the funded meanings which reinforce and enforce values.
These values lie in individual consciousness as forces, motivations, namely emotional-
volitional attitudes, which cannot be measured (economically) for the attitudes are not
reducible to feelings of pleasure and pain, nor to bare desires. Rather, they enforce the
entire conduct of the individual involving a feeling of reality.
26 However,  Mead noted,  Anderson’s  thesis,  which uses  social  psychology to  interpret
economic theory, does not fill the gap between social sciences and social psychology.
More  specifically,  Anderson  does  not  succeed  in  tracing  a  functional  relationship
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between the sociological notion of value as a phenomenon of social organization and
the psychological notion of value as an emotional-volitional attitude. He rather still
uses  a  parallel  approach  which  does  not  overcome  the  dualistic  methodological
perspective  on  the  issue.  The  main  question  that  Mead  posed  was:  What  are  the
conditions  under  which  value  takes  the  form  of  funded  meanings  in  the  social
organization,  and  under  what  conditions  does  they  appear  as  emotional-volitional
attitudes?  As  he  argued,  if  values  arise out  of  mutual  interaction  and  mutually
determination  of  individual  ends,  purposes,  desires  that  take  tangible,  determinate
shape as economic values, this means that the process of evaluation has to be seen as a
functional interaction between the world as a social object and the self-as-subject. But
there is here a circular process.  What was funded, namely social meaning, becomes
emotional-volitional  attitude,  and  what  is  emotional-volitional  attitude  becomes
meaning. It follows that meaning is an attitude to act, namely a way to give meaning, to
select and evaluate the world as social object and to give some of these evaluations a
measure (an economic measure). Mead concluded that: “It is in the process of stating
the attitude in terms of funded meaning that we must evaluate it – measure it against
other attitudes and determine what is its economic sum as compared with that of other
emotional-volitional  attitudes  that  arise  demanding  their  expression”  (Mead  1911:
435-6). Some 20 years later, in a critical paper published in 1930, one year after Cooley’s
death, Mead, in a similar way, denounced the limits of Cooley’s sociology. In particular,
he  argued  that  Cooley  had  accepted  the  psychophysical  parallelism  of  “ordinary
psychology,”  so  ignoring  primitive  impulses  of  social behavior  antecedent  to  the
distinction of psychical and outer world dimensions. Cooley’s conception of the relation
of the social mind to the organic structure and process of society sees the structure and
process as external, even if they are the structure and process of a living reality, whose
interrelationships make possible the social mind in individuals. As Mead put it, Cooley’s
interpretation  was  that  consciousness  is  an  internal  experience  of  the  life  of  the
external  organism,  so  setting  up  in  ordinary  psychology  a  “parallelism  between
sensations,  percepts,  emotions,  volitions,  and so forth,  and physiological  processes”
(Mead 1930: 701-2). This implies that it is possible to give a scientific account of the
physiological  process  without  introducing  parallel  states  of  consciousness.  The
question, asked in the review of Anderson’s book, had here become: “whether society is
itself psychical or whether the form of the psychical is a sort of communication which
arises  within  primitive  human  behavior”  (Mead  1930:  705).  And  this  question  was
related to another core question which at the time preoccupied Mead’s investigations:
How it is possible to overcome the individual/social dichotomy and explain the passage
from emotional-volitional attitudes to meaning in a shared social act? 
27 Mead had replied to  this  question by developing a  social  theory of  the Self  which,
rather than presupposing the individual to the social, attempts to intertwine biological
mechanism with reflective processes of organic interaction between individuals on the
one hand and social and physical environments on the other. 
28 According to Mead (1925), the human organism assumes the attitude of another which it
addresses by vocal gesture, and in this attitude, it addresses itself, thus giving rise to its
own self and to the other. In the process of communication “there appears a social world
of selves standing on the same level of immediate reality as that of the physical world
that surrounds us. It is out of this social world that the inner experiences arise which we
term psychical, and they serve largely in interpretation of this social world as psychical
sensations and percepts serve to interpret the physical objects of our environment”
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(Mead 1930: 704). The symbolic mediation is in an interdependent relation with the
individuals’  signification  of  their  relations  with  others  and  with  the  surrounding
reality. The “social meanings” are product of individuals’ ability to select and evaluate
stimuli on the basis of attitudes shared by the group to which they belong that uses a
semiotic  frame  of  reference  for  the  interpretation,  processing,  and  valuation  of
accepted behaviors. The individual process of semiotic interpretation of reality is thus
a process that simultaneously determines their beliefs and the meanings they attribute
to the surrounding reality, and it is the process that conditions the constitution of their
identities.
 
Mead’s Social Psychology and Philosophy as the
Counterpart of Sen’s Capability Approach
29 Individuals  acquire  their  identities  through communication  processes  in  which  the
organized community or social group gives the individuals their unity as self. The sum
of  the vocal  and gestural  replies  of  others  to  an individual’s  stimuli  constitute  the
attitude of the whole community towards the individual’s behavior. Mead called such a
social attitude the ‘generalized other,’ depicting it as the crystallizing of all particular
attitudes  into  a  single  attitude  or  standpoint  (Mead 1934:  90).  Individuals  take  the
general attitude towards the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or
set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group,
they are engaged. As Mead argues: 
Only in so far as [the individual] takes the attitudes of the organized social group to
which he belongs toward the organized, cooperative social activity or set of such
activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self or
possess the sort of complete self  he has developed. And on the other hand, the
complex  cooperative  processes  and activities  and  institutional  functioning  of
organized  human  society  are  also  possible  only  in  so  far  as  every  individual
involved in them or belonging to that society can take the general attitudes of all
other  such  individuals  with  reference  to  these  processes  and  activities  and
institutional  functionings,  and  to  the  organized  social  whole  of  experiential
relations and interactions thereby constituted – and can direct his own behavior
accordingly. (Mead 1934: 155)
30 Behind the common social activity there is a set of social primitive instincts according
to the nature of which the distinction between me and the other is given. The instincts
are social in the sense that the individual’s gestural and vocal responses arise in answer
to indications of various movements by other individuals of the group. We briefly recall
here Mead’s thesis of the emergence of human consciousness from the earliest stages of
the proceedings in which are rooted emotional attitudes. According to his thesis, the
inhibition due to the conflict of impulses stimulates the preparation of the act in its
earliest stages. The emotional tension takes over the function of showing to others the
answer that the individual is going to implement over the stimulus received, so that the
other individuals can respond in turn to the stimulus of the first individual. Emotion is
therefore already communication and immerses the body of individuals in this innate
communicative dimension.15 
31 Behind this idea are Mead’s and Dewey’s Theory of Emotion (Mead 1895; and Dewey 1894,
and 1895), according to which the expression of certain emotional attitudes constitute
evidence of the passing over of emotional attitude as a “mode of behavior” into the
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“communicative  gesture”  (see  Dreon  2016;  Baggio  2015;  and  Garrison  2003).  The
progress of more controlled gestures consists in transforming potential reflex actions –
expressions of strong emotional power – into actions characterized by interest (rather
than passion).  The distinction between interest  and passion marks the dividing line
between individual instincts connected to immediate consummation of needs and the
social  instincts –  e.g.  the  urge  to  fight  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  process  of  food
consumption, that is, a socializing process of something primarily individual. The early
stages  of  these  activities  give  rise  in  the  individual,  along  with  antisocial  socio-
physiological  impulses  (Mead  1934:  303-4),  to  what  is  currently  called  pro-social
emotions,  namely,  psycho-physiological  reactions  to  movements  of  other  group
members that induce agents to engage in cooperative behavior (cf.  Bowles & Gintis
2011). The bio-social mechanism is in fact at the basis of the feeling of sympathy, which
consists,  according  to  Mead’s  definition,  in  “a  distinctively  human,  that  is,  self-
conscious,  social  attitude  toward  another  individual  […]  is  to  identify  yourself
sympathetically  with him,  by taking his  attitude toward,  and his  role  in,  the given
social situation, and by thus responding to that situation implicitly as he does or is
about to do explicitly” (Mead 1934: 300). Mead depicts sympathetic identification as a
natural process presenting both cognitive and affective aspects, since it refers to both
the capacity to represent the other’s  intentions and beliefs (attitudes) and to share
their feelings.16
32 Mead’s notion of sympathy has its philosophical basis in David Hume’s Treatise of Human
Nature and  in  Adam  Smith’s  The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  in  which  sympathy  is
referred to as a quality of human nature at the basis of communication and social rules.
According to Hume (1740:  Bk II,  Part II,  Sec.  V),  sympathy is  a disposition to share
sentiments, to participate in the emotional life of others, and to form general rules.
Smith, who further elaborates Hume’s use of sympathy,17 considers sympathy to be an
individual’s  “fellow-feeling  with  any passion whatever”  which may arise  from “the
view of a certain emotion in another person,” but not “from the view of the passion, as
from that of the situation which excites it” through the imagination (Smith 1790: I, I, 1,
§ 10). This is due to the fact that people have learned from experience ways to approve or
disapprove of the opinions of others (I, I, 3, §§ 3-4), as well as their own (III, 1, §§ 4-5).
According  to  Smith,  sympathy  is  a  complex  imaginative  process  that  presents  an
emotive content and helps the individual to evaluate a complex situation in order to
approve or disapprove. Thus sympathy is involved in moral evaluations which can also
be self-evaluations. 
33 As Mead argues: “It is in the form of the generalized other that […] the community
exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is in this form that
the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual’s
thinking” (Mead 1934: 155). And in societies that have an organized legal system that
prevents hostile impulses giving rise to violence, anti-social impulses are directed to
the functioning of the economic system and to attitudes of rivalry and competition. In
other words, human impulses of hostility find their exhaust device in the dynamics of
social conflict between different economic classes. The economic process of exchange
necessarily, consequently, depends upon an identification of the self with the other,
and this can take place between living forms in which there is the ability to put oneself
in another’s place through communication. The mechanism of communication carries
with it  the possibility of conversation with others,  but also with those who are not
members of  the group,  for the social  pattern is  larger than the group that it  makes
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possible, including enemies, guests, and the morals of behavior toward them. Thus the
logical  universe  of  discourse  is  implicated  and  with  it  the  possibility  of  shared
meanings and values of exchange. From such a point of view, economic exchange has to
be seen as a symbolic mediation in which the decision is strictly linked to the process of
identification with the others (see Mead 1934: 300-2).
34 Like Mead, Sen argues that the demands of ethical objectivity have close connections
with  our  language,  which  “reflects  the  variety  of  concerns  on  which  our  ethical
assessments draw” (Sen 2009: 119). Whilst Sen refers here to Gramsci’s assertion,18 as
well as to Putnam (2002) and Walsh (2003), what he intended to shed light upon is, close
to  Mead,  the  central  role  communication assumes  in  the  process  of  reasoning  and
public discussion. As he writes: 
The need of objectivity for communication and for language of public reasoning is
followed by  the  more  specific  requirements  of  objectivity  in  ethical  evaluation,
incorporating demands of impartiality. Objectivity in each sense has a role in the
exercise  in  public  reasoning,  and the  roles  are  interrelated but  not  exactly  the
same. (Sen 2009: 122)
 
Sympathy and Commitment
35 It seems now possible to look at the CA from the perspective of Mead’s theory of the
genesis of the self as social and communicative in nature. In particular, it is possible to
consider Mead’s idea of ‘social conduct’ and social construction of meanings together
with Sen’s argument of a “natural selection” of certain pro-social behavioral modes
based on an evolutionary influence. This integrated approach allows us to regard the
mesh of  physical,  mental,  and social  dimensions  of  interaction with  the  social  and
physical worlds as the basis of the constitution of persons’ identities as well as their
shared desires, self- and other-regarding interests, preferences and choices.
36 The experiences that individuals have and their proximity to others occur in relation to
what Mead calls the “generalized other,” namely the: “organized community or social
group which gives to the individual his unity of self” (Mead 1934: 154). The attitude of
the ‘generalized other’ is the attitude of the whole community, namely the common
ethos which  gives  unity  and  consistency  to  individual  identity.19 The  community’s
identity is thus embedded in the self as a co-determining factor of their evaluation of
preferences and choices. People’s social attitudes, which in part contribute and in part
are subject to community values (often non-commensurable values),20 offer the basis for
taking  into  account  the  attitudes  of  others  through  which  private  subjective
preferences become potentially shareable. Thus, social interaction is also the ‘shared
place’ in which all aspects of freedom contribute to the constructive role individuals play
in  the  formation  and  modification  of  their  community’s  values  and  ethics,  for  the
importance of capabilities that groups enjoy are based on the value that members of
the group or other people “place on the proficiency of that group” (Sen 2009: 246). In
other words,  the organization of  social  groups is  related to the organization of  the
members’ roles arising within the social process in which that group is engaged, or
which it pursues. The nature of what Sen (2009: 255-6) calls “community relationship”
or  “social  capital”  (referring  to  Robert  Putnam  2000),  as  well  as  the  relational
perspectives, in particular of the personal resources needed for taking part in the life of
the community, is in accord with Mead’s idea that 
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‘social’ aspect of human society – which is simply the social aspect of the selves of
all  individual members taken collectively – with its concomitant feelings on the
parts of all these individuals of cooperation and social interdependence, is the basis
for the development and existence of ethical ideals in that society. (Mead 1934: 321)
37 In  fact,  according  to  Mead,  concrete  personal  interests  are  reconstructed  in  their
relations to other selves’ interests, whose relations are essential to one self’s identity
(see Mead 1964: 149). Thus, the social norms are based on feelings of cooperation and
social  interdependence,  and  paraphrasing  Robert  Putnam  we  may  say  that  ethical
ideals have to be “embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations” from
which arise reciprocity and trustworthiness (Putnam 2000: 16). In other words, what is
essential to ethical ideals of a society is “an organization of common attitudes which
shall be found in all individuals” (Mead 1934: 323) and which characterizes the “social
capital” as well as “its conceptual cousin”: the “community” (Putnam 2000: 19).21
38 Sen would then agree with Mead’s explanation of the Self as constituted socially and
following particular  rules  of  conduct.  And he  would agree  with Mead’s  idea that  a
“multiple  personality  is  in  a  certain  sense  normal”  (Mead 1934:  142).  According to
Mead,  in fact,  we all  have multiple identities,  dividing “ourselves up in all  sorts  of
different  selves  with  reference  to  our  acquaintances”  (Mead  1934:  143).  Expressed
differently, the various elementary identities which are organized into a complete Self
are the various aspects of that complete Self related to the various aspects of the social
process, and the structure of the complete Self is “a reflection of the complete social
process”  (Mead  1934:  144).  Consonant  with  Mead’s  claim,  and  responding  to  those
authors who criticized his CA to conceive human freedom in an individualistic light
(Deneulin & McGregor 2009; Evans 2002; and Gore 1997), Sen argues that:
Individual human beings with their various plural identities, multiple affiliations
and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of
societal interactions. Proposals to see a person merely as a member of one social
group  tend  to  be  based  on  an  inadequate  understanding  of  the  breadth  and
complexity of any society in the world. (Sen 2009: 247)
39 This does not mean that one’s  multiple social  identities are in certain crucial  ways
matters  of  personal  choice.  On  the  contrary,  multiple  identities  are  part  of  the
complexity of society in which human beings live. Such a claim implies the connection
of  CA  to  Mead’s  theory  of  the  social  self  more  urgent,  for  the  latter  offers  some
elements that are useful to explain the development of the plural identities of human
beings, their evaluation of the lives they want to live and the interests they have reason
to pursue, and what influences operate on their evaluative processes. 
40 Furthermore, Sen’s highlighting Smith’s concept of an ‘impartial spectator’ as a notion
that has much to contribute to a fuller understanding of what it means to go beyond
individual’s and local groups’ particular interests and concerns, is at the core of the
possible interdependence between Mead’s and Sen’s approaches. In particular, as we
have seen, Sen argues that one of the main motivations of Smith’s use of the “impartial
spectator” was to broaden human understanding and to widen the reach of  ethical
inquiry.  The  “impartial  spectator”  is  related  to  an  “open  impartiality”  invoking
disinterested judgments of spectators not necessarily belonging to the local group. The
impartial  view “may come from far or from within a community,  or a nation,  or a
culture” (Sen 2009: 123).
41 On this point, it is worth noting the similarities between Mead’s “generalized other”
and Smith’s “impartial spectator.” These similar notions highlight the crucial role that
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imagination assumes in both authors’  moral theories,  and specifically in their ideas
concerning individual learning of social rules by taking “the role of the other” as well
as the perspective of the “interior man” (as Smith called the impartial spectator in his
Theory of  Moral  Sentiments).  For both authors,  the ability to put oneself  in another’s
shoes  is  related  to  the  acquiring  of  a  shared  perspective  on  human  meanings and
conducts. Mead’s distinction between “me” and “I,” the first indicating the historical
Self as well as the Social perspective about rules, as opposed to the I as the active and
impulsive self, is close to the distinction Smith makes in the sixth paragraph of the
third  part  of  the  The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments between  two versions  of  “I,”  “the
examiner and judge,” and “the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.”
As Smith argues (III, 1, § 6), the first “I” “is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard
to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by
considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view.
The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct,
under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion.” 
42 Now from Mead’s perspective, one could say that the self’s behavioral attitudes toward
others show the interdependence between communal goals and self’s goals at the core
of social acts, without implying either the identification between self-interest and the
interests of others or, by contrast, the idea that communal goals are the products of a
pure sentiment of altruism. Habitual reflection is  in fact based upon the embedded
ability of learning social habits, namely social rules of actions. Habits would result from
the  action  of  natural  selection  consisting  in  a  process  of  empirical  generalization
through which habits became normative. As Mead writes (Mead 1934: 379),  we “are
what we are through our relationship to others. Inevitably, then, our end must be a
social  end,  both  from  the  standpoint  of  its  content  (that  which  would  answer  to
primitive impulses) and also from the point of view of form.” He continues: 
One is constituted out of his own interests; and when those interests are frustrated,
what is called for then is in some sense a sacrifice of this narrow self. This should
lead to the development of a larger self which can be identified with the interests of
others. I think all of us feel that one must be ready to recognize the interests of
others even when they run counter to our own, but that the person who does that
does not really sacrifice himself, but becomes a larger self. (Mead 1934: 386)22
43 This  offers  a  theoretical  tool  to  explain  Sen’s  distinction  between  sympathy and
commitment.  The  former  corresponds  “to  the  case  in  which  the  concern  of  others
directly affects one’s own welfare” (Sen 1977: 326). The conception of self-interest may
in  fact  include  the  individual’s  concern  for  others,  and  “sympathy  may  thus  be
incorporated within the notion of the person’s well-being, broadly defined” (Sen 2000:
270). Then the pursuit of one’s own utility may be assisted by pleasure taken in others’
pleasures and the pain wrought by others’ pain. In contrast, commitment is concerned
with breaking the link between a person’s welfare and their choice of action through
predictions of welfare states, driving a wedge between personal choice and personal
welfare. Thus, it is related to the intrinsic importance of the role of agency and the
influence  that  this  role  has  on  the  individual’s  evaluation  of  what  is  valuable.
Commitment is closely connected to anticipated welfare levels, that is, to the possibility
of postponing some sorts of acts of consummation connected to the choice of personal
welfare.  To  refer  to  anticipated levels  excludes  acts  against  “self-interest  resulting
purely from a failure to foresee consequences” (Sen 1977: 327). As Sen puts it: “man is a
social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only […]. An
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act of choice for this social animal is, in a fundamental sense, always a social act” (Sen
1973: 252-3). It is possible that a person may be induced by social codes of behavior to
act as if she has different preferences from what she really have and then that her
choices may be guided by motives, the pursuit of personal well-being being only one of
them. In other words, a person may be willing to make sacrifices invoking “values other
than  personal  well-being  or  self-interest  (including  the  self-interest  involved  in
promoting the interests of those with whom we sympathize)” (Sen 2000: 270. See also
Sen 1985: 188). 
44 The core concept here is that of preference, the normal use of which identifies it with
the  concept  of  “being  better  off,”  and  preferred  with  chosen  (Sen  1977:  329).
Commitment is then a part of behavior. It does not presuppose rationality but it does
not exclude it: “insofar as consequences on others have to be more clearly understood
and assessed in terms of one’s values and instincts, the scope for reasoning may well
expand” (Sen 1977: 344).23
45 Connecting these reflections to CA, we can then argue that, according to Sen, such an
approach  is  concerned  with  both  interpersonal  interdependence,  that  is,  being
influenced by other people’s habits (Sen 1977: 330), and the social opportunities people
have to improve the quality of their lives. To refer to the adjective “social” is to remind:
“not to view individuals and their opportunities in isolated terms. The options that a
person has depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state and other
institutions do” (Drèze & Sen 2002: 6).24 Given such a point of view, it is possible to refer
to Mead’s idea that: “To do justice to the recognition of the uniqueness of an individual
in social terms, there must be not only the differentiation which we do have in a highly
organized society but a differentiation in which the attitudes involved can be taken by
other members of the group” (Mead 1934: 325).
 
Conclusion
46 Sen’s approach to capability is based on the role of agency and pays attention to social
structures and groups. Thus, it is connected to issues of social change. He argues that
people have to have more freedom to live the kind of life that, upon reflection, they
have reason to value. Our evaluations should focus upon what we are able to do and be,
on the quality of people’s lives, and on removing obstacles so that they have the chance
to lead the kind of life they wish to live.
47 According to Robeyns, to fully understand the importance of groups in the constitution
of opportunities, the CA “should engage more intensively in a dialogue with disciplines
such as sociology, anthropology, history, and gender and cultural studies” (Robeyns
2005:  109).  But  also,  in  my  opinion,  with  social  and  cognitive  psychology  and
communicative  sciences  as  functional  dimensions  of  the  constitution  of  individual
preferences  and  practical  judgments.  Social  structures  and  institutions  have  an
important effect on capability sets. It is crucial to know both the psychical and social
determinants of the relevant capabilities, as only these determinants can be changed.
48 This would also be of great importance to the study of individual economic behavior. It
offers some new elements for constructing a more complete theoretical framework of
human nature and conduct (see Baggio 2017). This would also help us to develop some
experimental hypothesis to test the consistency of day-to-day behavior.
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49 Mead’s  socio-psychological  approach  to  human  behavior  offers  a  new  theoretical
framework, a kind of paradigm to develop a new idea of human conduct in which the
different  components  of  self  are  seen  to  be  functionally  intertwined  in  a  social
structure. To re-think Mead’s theory of social self in the light of a wider perspective on
human  conduct  and  decision-making  processes  would  strengthen,  at  once,  the
principled commitment to freedom of choice, revealing in a ‘Mead-Sen’ perspective, as
it were, the instrumental role of behavioral patterns and socio-cultural environment
(social group, community, nationality, race, sex, and now increasingly, social media) in
the orientation of individual behaviors. Since, in fact, choices are products of acts of
evaluation,  namely “evaluative judgments” (Sen 2000:  80),  and such acts have moral
significance,  my  proposal  would  help  us  to  enlarge  the  theoretical  framework  of
capability,  opening the way to a wider theory of synthetic reasoning and judgment
processes from a pragmatist point of view. Moreover, if it is true that, as Sen puts it, in
“valuing a person’s ability to take part in the life of the society, there is an implicit
valuation of the life of the society itself” (Sen 2009: 246), pragmatism would offer a
theoretical contribution to the CA in the selection of the various informational foci that
influence the assessment of societies and social institutions concerned with a plurality
of different features of individual’s lives and concerns, addressing “a bit more reality
than a picture of a world in which there is only one good thing” (Sen 2009: 240).
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NOTES
1. In speaking of “judgment of practice” or of “practical judgment,” I refer here to Dewey’s essay
on The Logic of Judgment of Practice (1916) in which Dewey defines the practical judgment as “a
kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-matter,” namely a judgment: “of a situation
demanding action” (Dewey 1916: 14). The object of the practical judgment “implies an incomplete
situation,” and it is: “about the situation in which one is included, and in which a multitude of
other  factors  external  to  self  are included”  (Dewey  1916:  16).  On  Dewey’s  logic  of  practical
judgment,  see Frega (2006:  143-68,  and 2008:  ix-xxxiii).  On the comparison between Sen and
Dewey on the process of evaluation as a practical judgment, see De Munck & Zimmermann 2015.
2. According to Sen (1979: 538), there are three properties of welfarist approaches: Welfarism “is a
function of personal utility levels, so that any two social states must be ranked entirely on the
basis of personal utilities in the respective states (irrespective of the non-utility features of the
states)”; Ordinalism, namely the ordinal properties of individual utility functions; Noncomparable
utilites, namely the indipendence of the social walfare ranking of the way the utilities of different
individuals compare with each other; Pareto Preference Rule: if everyone has more utility in x as in
y,  and if  someone has more utility in x than in y,  then x is  socially better than y.  The main
problems of such approaches are the informational restrictions implicit in these conditions and
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that  they  are  strictly  related  not  exclusive  to  the  evaluation  of  outcomes  but  more  to  a
corresponding assessment of right action.
3. The utility numbering interprets ignorance as equal probability between different choices (Sen
1979: 200).
4. Primary  goods  are  in  a  “ relationship between  persons  and  goods”  (Sen  1979),  namely,  a
relationship in which good things do something to human beings. Sen refers to Rawls’ principle of
justice, speaking of primary goods as: “things that every rational man is presumed to want.” Sen
criticizes Rawls’ principle of justice (1982) according to which there are five groups of primary
goods the bundle of which have to maximize the minimum: basic liberties; freedom of movement
and  choice  of  occupation;  powers  and  prerogatives  of  offices  and  positions  of  public
responsibility; income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. The first two are prior to
the  pursuit  of  the  others.  Sen  (1979)  criticizes  Rawls’  proposal  arguing  that  he  tends  to  be
“primary good fetishist.” Summing up, Sen criticizes Rawls’ defense of ‘impartiality’ (justice as
fairness)  and  “mutual  advantage”  based  on  the  “veil  of  ignorance”  argument,  claiming  that
individuals  behind the ‘veil’  would choose the maximum principle  over an index of  primary
goods  as  the  accepted  social  contract  (Basu  &  López-Calva  2011:  162;  Sen  2009:  52-74).  It  is
important, Sen argues, “to distinguish capability – representing freedom actually enjoyed – from
both (1) primary goods (and other resources), and (2) actually chosen lives (and other realized
results)” (Sen 1990a: 116; see also Sen 1992). Related to this is the distinction between freedom
and the means to achieve freedom, and freedom and achievement.
5. “Given her personal characteristics, social background, economic circumstances and so on, a
person has the ability to do (or be) certain things that she has reason to value. The reason for
valuation can be direct (the functioning involved may directly enrich her life, such as being well-
nourished or being healthy),  or indirect  (the functioning involved may contribute to further
production, or command a price in the market)” (Sen 2000: 293).
6. “Identifying  the  value  of  the  capability  set  with  the  value  of  the  chosen  functioning
combination permits the capability approach to put as much weight – including possibly all the
weight – on actual achievements” (Sen 2009: 236).
7. Sen (1990b) and Nussbaum (2000) pay attention to the social norms and traditions that form
women’s  preferences  and  influence  their  aspirations  and  effective  choices.  Sen  refers,  as
examples,  to  ancestral  practices  such  as  the  genital  mutilation  of  young  women  or  the
punishment of adulterous women.
8. Also, James’ concept of a social self as constituent of the self would be useful here useful if we
are to identify some analogies between Sen’s and pragmatists’ ideas. However, a full discussion of
James’ psychology is beyond the scope of this paper.
9. See on this point, among others, Sharma & Sharma 2010; and Max-Neef & Ekins 1992.
10. “Behavioral codes vary even among the developed capitalist economies, and so does their
effectiveness in promoting economic performance. While capitalism has been very successful in
radically enhancing output and raising productivity in the modern world, it is still the case that
the experiences of different countries are quite diverse” (Sen 2000: 265).
11. One may say that Deneulin and McGregor have as target Ingrid Robeyns’s indication of the
capability approach as an ethical individualism, namely that only individuals are the units of
moral  concern  –  and  social  affairs  are  evaluated  for  their  direct  and  indirect  effects  on
individuals (Deneulin & McGregor 2009: 17). However, Deneulin and McGregor explicitly refer
also to Sen and to the capability approach as “advanced by Sen.” In another point of their paper
they argue that the capability approach “as enunciated by Sen is deliberately and fundamentally
incomplete” for “his development of the approach focuses more on the challenges of freedom
than on the challenges of living together” (Deneulin & McGregor 2009: 10). One, thence, may also
suppose that  their  target  is  Sen’s  arguments  and only  indirectly  Robeyen’s  interpretation of
them.
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12. As is known, since the 1980s a partnership between economics and psychology (in particular,
cognitive psychology) has offered some interesting insights on human preferences, behaviors,
and the hedonistic dimension of choices, showing that people often do not choose what they
really want and do not have consistent preferences since they do not know how to maximize
them (Kahneman et al. 1997; Kahneman 2011).
13. Zimmermann (2006) has shown the potential of the connections between CA and Pragmatism
for  a  qualitative  method  of  inquiry  into  sociological  issues  that  draws  on  a  pragmatist  and
configurational  approach.  For  a  more  general  perspective  against  the  dichotomy  between
normative and social inquiry, see Frega 2014.
14. It is noteworthy that Mead’s criticism of the psychological presuppositions of the economic
science is consonant with Thorstein Veblen’s critique of neoclassical economic theories (Veblen
1899a, 1899b, 1900 and 1909), as well as Dewey’s critique of marginal utility (see Tilman & Knapp
1999). Baggio (2016a) sketches some considerations of Veblen’s implicit and explicit references to
pragmatism and functional psychology in Veblen’s writings on evolutionary economics from the
years 1896-1900, when he was at the University of Chicago with Dewey and Mead.
15. It  is  worth  noting  that,  nowadays,  the  “physiological  fringes”  involved  in  “unconscious
communication” are explained by neural systems involved in the genesis of emotional sequences
in action in the performance of specific acts. Panksepp has recently indicated eight neuronal
systems that express, among others, interpersonal emotional systems of attachment, care-giving,
the  competitive  interaction,  and  joint  cooperation.  These  systems  express  the  innate  social
dimension of bodies and form the basis of the most advanced forms of human social interaction
(see  Panksepp  1998;  and  Liotti  2005).  It  is  just  to  note  that  we  are  not  speaking  of  an
anachronistic theory of the origin of human communication. Baldwin highlights the fact that
many of Mead’s studies have anticipated the modern analysis of social behaviorism on emotions.
In  particular,  there  are  many  aspects  present  in  the  writings  of  Mead  which  have  been
empirically  verified  during  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  (Baldwin  1992).  For  further
reading on this point, see Baggio 2016c.
16. Some insights on Mead’s bio-social theory of the Self and pragmatist basis of neuroeconomics
are developed in Baggio 2016b. Here a parallel between Mead’s bio-social theory of mind and the
Self  and the cognitive sciences are sketched with the aim of  shedding light on some topical
economic issues.
17. An  interesting  insight  into  the  cognitive  and  affective  dimensions  of  Smith’s  notion  of
sympathy is elaborated in Bréban 2015.
18. “In acquiring one’s conception of the world one always belongs to a particular grouping
which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting. We are
all  conformists  of  some  conformism  or  other,  always  man  in  the  mass  or  collective  man”
(Gramsci 1975: 324).
19. “It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of
the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over
the conduct of its individual members; for it is in this form that the social process or community
enters as a determining factor into the individual’s thinking” (Mead 1934: 155).
20. On this point, see Klamer 2003. According to Sen, non-commensurability “is present when
several dimensions of value are irreducible to one another” (Sen 2009: 240).
21. Putnam  points  out  that  norms  of  reciprocity  are  generally  good  for  those  inside  the
community, but the external effects of social capital are not always positive. A social group may
exploit  social  capital  “to achieve ends that are antisocial  from a wider perspective” (Putnam
2000: 19). On this point, Mead would have argued that even social situations involving complex
social  antagonisms  and  diversities  of social  interests,  and  lacking  the  unifying  influence  of
common social ends and motives, are “definite aspects of or ingredients in the general relational
pattern of that process as a whole” (Mead 1934: 323). They are therefore aspects of a potentially
Sen and Mead on Identity, Agency, and Economic Behavior
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
21
enlarged “social capital.” According to Mead, “an organization of common attitudes which shall
be found in all individuals” can help to implement positive external effects (Mead 1934: 323). This
means  making  individuals  “more  aware  of  the  collective  significance  of  the  myriad  minute
decisions that we make daily to invest – or disinvest – in social capital” (Putnam 2000: 439).
22. On this point, it is useful to refer to the ethical reflections of Mead’s colleague and friend John
Dewey,  who argues  that:  “both self-love  and altruism are  acquired dispositions,  not  original
ingredients in our psychological make-up, and that each of them may be either morally good or
morally  reprehensible.  Psychologically  speaking,  our  native  impulses  and  acts  are  neither
egoistic nor altruistic; that is, they are not actuated by conscious regard for either one’s own food
or that of others. They are rather direct responses to situations” (Dewey & Tufts 1932: 324).
23. “Since the prevailing individualism was expressed in an economic theory and practice which
taught that each man was actuated by an exclusive regard for his own profit, moralists were led
to insist upon the need of some check upon this ruthless individualism, and to accentuate the
supremacy in morals (as distinct from business) of sympathy and benevolent regard for others.
The other significance of this appeal is, however, to make us realize the fact that regard for self
and  regard  for  others  are  both  of  them  secondary  phases  of  a  more  normal  and  complete
interest:  regard for the welfare and integrity of  the social  groups of  which we form a part”
(Dewey & Tufts 1932: 331-2).
24. One of the main consequences of this approach would be that, since agency roles concern an
individual’s  evaluation  of  motives  which  would  be  different  from  personal  preferences,  the
mixture of motivations makes it hard to gain insight into their well-being on the basis of the
observation of  behavior  (Sen 1985:  188).  Whilst  behavior  may correspond to  some constants
interpreted  as preferences,  the  causal  connection  almost  never  could  be  inferred  to  be  as
straightforward as it a theory of revealed preferences assumes. To identify a pattern of behavior
does not explain it. The rejection of the epistemic value of introspection and communication and
simplification  of  the  relationship  between  preference  and  behavior  underestimate  the  role
subjective elements and ethical rules specific to a certain social context play in decision-making.
On the contrary, the new framework helps to rehabilitate the epistemic value of introspection
and a richer multi-level approach to the analysis of people’s economic behavior. On this point see
Baggio 2016c.
ABSTRACTS
The paper seeks to show the potentialities of a wider perspective concerning human economic
behavior and decision-making processes intertwining Mead’s and Sen’s ideas on self-identity and
social  context.  Emerging  developments  of  my  findings  strengthen,  at  once,  the  principled
commitment to freedom of choice, revealing from a “Mead-Sen” perspective the instrumental
role  of  social  behavioral  patterns  and  socio-cultural  environment  (social  group,  community,
nationality, race, sex, and now social media) in the orientation of persons’ (economic) behaviors.
In particular, a Mead-Sen approach would help clarify how people develop their attitudes and
dispositions to think and behave, namely examining the habits at the basis of everyday processes
of evaluation and choice as manifestations of practical judgment.
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